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Abstract 
Adversarial images, inputs designed to produce errors in machine 
learning systems, are a common way for researchers to test the abil-
ity of algorithms to perform tasks such as image classification. 
"Fooling images" are a common kind of adversarial image, causing 
miscategorisation errors which can then be used to diagnose prob-
lems within an image classification algorithm. Situations where 
human and computer categorise an image differently, which arise 
from adversarial images, reveal discrepancies between human im-
age interpretation and that of computers. In this paper, aspects of 
state of the art machine learning research and relevant artistic pro-
jects touching on adversarial image approaches will be contextual-
ised in reference to current theories. Harun Farocki's concept of the 
operative image [1] will be used as a model for understanding the 
coded and procedural nature of automated image interpretation. 
Through comparison of current adversarial image methodologies, 
this paper will consider what this kind of image production reveals 
about the differences between human and computer visual inter-
pretation. 
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 Introduction 
Image identification tasks are becoming increasingly auto-
mated using machine learning to handle large visual data-
sets. Adversarial approaches are developed in parallel to im-
age classification algorithms in order to test algorithms' ef-
fectiveness by identifying errors, for example by causing an 
image to be misclassified. Many adversarial image attacks 
involve using discrepancies between the limits of human 
and computer image interpretation to make images human-
readable but computer-unreadable. This means that an im-
age may be adversarial in nature while having little to no 
outward indication that it is so. Adversarial content is 
thereby obscured from human vision while the image's hu-
man-determined meaning is obscured from the computer. 
Close examination of adversarial images and the errors they 
trigger help discern the limitations of machine learning sys-
tems to decipher digital images. In the following paper, 
diverse examples of adversarial image approaches will be 
explored in relation to the concept of the operative image 
and the relative decipherability and obscurity of digital im-
ages. 
Adversarial Approaches 
While computers can be more efficient than humans at pro-
cessing large amounts of visual data, it doesn't take much to 
render a human-interpretable image unreadable to a com-
puter. Because machine learning systems are often black 
box, it is challenging to develop methodologies to test them 
and to understand the cause of errors which arise. Many ad-
versarial images are intended to be human-readable at the 
same time as tricking an algorithm, using human image in-
terpretation as a baseline to check when computer image in-
terpretation diverges from that standard. For this reason, ad-
versarial image attacks often involve image interpretation 
tasks which are easily performed by most humans but which 
pose immense technical challenges for current computers 
[2]. Merely flipping an image upside down, for instance, can 
render an image incomprehensible to a computer and cause 
the image to be classified as something other than what it 
appears to be to humans. On the other end of the spectrum, 
computers can be tricked into classifying images consisting 
entirely of visual noise as specific objects, with a high de-
gree of certainty [3]. 
 Transformation, distortion, the addition of visual noise 
and the use of context cues are a few of the most commonly 
used techniques to achieve errors in algorithmic image clas-
sification. These approaches rely on problematising tasks in 
which humans excel, which correspond to computer inabil-
ity. The production of images which are read differently in 
parallel by humans and computers entails understanding and 
implementing differences between the two visual pro-
cessing systems. Internal knowledge about the way that hu-
mans see and process images is synthesised with knowledge 
about the boundaries of computer vision. Much like vision 
charts used to measure the resolution of biological vision, 
which test the limit of what size letters a person can read at 
a distance, adversarial images function as a test to determine 
the limits of image classification algorithms. If a computer 
classifies an image of a cat as an ostrich (see Figure 1), for 
example, a limitation in the image classification algorithm 
used is thereby established.  
Adversarial Image Research 
The past year was an eventful one in machine learning re-
search, with several papers causing shockwaves in the field 
with adversarial examples which showed that although al-
gorithms for analysing images are human-competitive in 
many ways, they are not without flaws. Two ground-break-
ing examples of adversarial image attacks include an ap-
proach whereby only one pixel in an image needs to be mod-
ified to trigger an error [4] and a 3d-printed turtle, which 
computers confuse for a rifle [5]. 
 A research project known as the "one pixel attack" [4] 
demonstrated that significantly changing a single pixel was 
enough to cause it an image to be miscategorised by other-
wise highly successful algorithms. In this project, research-
ers sought to change images in a human-imperceptible fash-
ion while rendering them unreadable to algorithms. By lim-
iting the transformation of the starting image to a single 
point, it is possible to maintain an image's semblance for hu-
man viewers. Many common adversarial attack approaches 
apply a slight perturbation to all pixels in an image, but by 
contrast, this methodology limits the number of pixels al-
tered but allows the perturbation to be unlimited in scale. 
"Natural images", the data-set of images to be sorted, were 
evolved using an evolutionary algorithm which tested out 
different variations on the image. This process was used to 
determine the placement of the attacking pixel which would 
be changed and the degree to which it was altered from the 
original. For each starting image, a set of attacking images 
was evolved, corresponding to each of the possible target 
classes used in the experiment. Different versions of an im-
age of a dog, for instance, were thereby made to register as 
a cat, an automobile, a frog, and so on. 
 Another innovative project entailed 3d printing a fairly 
realistic-looking turtle, which, when placed in front of a 
webcam and analysed by a deep neural network is registered 
as a rifle [5]. The effect is successful from any angle the 
turtle is positioned in, whether it is tilted, flipped upside 
down or turned in any direction. The method used is similar 
to that of the one-pixel attack, taken a few steps further. In 
this approach, an adversarial image-texture is developed and 
validated, then mapped onto a 3d model and made into a 
physical object. The attacking image is thereby made 
resistant to variations such as position, lighting and back-
ground, making it suitable for real-world application. This 
project also involved a large amount of practical testing, ex-
amining how the objects were "perceived" in various situa-
tions. It also moves beyond the still image, toward dealing 
with visual content "in the wild", by bringing adversarial im-
age approaches into the physical world of objects. 
 Applications have also been made publicly available for 
use by non-experts, including the Ostrichinator web demo 
[6]. The Ostrichinator enables users to automatically trans-
form an ordinary image in such a way that it is classified as 
an ostrich, using the smallest possible change of pixels. One 
can also select to change the image so that it registers as an-
other class of images by selecting from a drop-down menu. 
In the example produced for the purpose of this paper, an 
image of a cat was transformed so that it would be misclas-
sified as an ostrich. (see Figure 1.) 
Artistic Adversarial Image Approaches 
Artists have taken on related investigations, considering 
how computers interpret images and seeking to implement 
those parameters as a visual language. 
 Adam Harvey, in his project CVdazzle [7], has produced 
a look-book of suggested styling tips for evading face detec-
tion. The makeup and hairstyles presented in the project 
break the continuity of models' faces with colourful, angular 
lines, patterns and tufts of hair in unexpected places. By dis-
rupting the symbols which constitute a face for computer vi-
sion, these styles render the face undetectable. Another pro-
ject of Harvey's works toward undermining biometric iden-
tification by merging passport photos of multiple people. 
The images created through this process can thereby be used 
by one person so they can pass as someone else, without 
arousing the suspicion of a border control officer. 
 Sascha Pohflepp's Spacewalk [8] is a generative adversar-
ial network (GAN) [9] which functions like a game played 
between two neural networks. The one neural network cre-
ates images with the goal of tricking the other neural net-
work into classifying the fabricated image as a "real" photo-
graph. The data used to train the networks is a set of images 
of predatory animals, leading to images of mangled, leop-
ard-printed shapes, suggesting a clash between predator and 
prey. What is interesting about this approach is that it in-
volves the generative neural network making inferences 
about what might appear convincing to the judging neural 
network. 
 Richard Overill's Image Steganography consists of a 
fairly ordinary-looking snapshot of a girl leaning against a 
railing [10]. What is significant about this image is that it 
contains another image embedded within it. Using the tech-
nique of digital steganography, Overill concealed a secret 
message within the least important pixels which define the 
visible image by offsetting their values nominally. Using a 
special code one can unlock the hidden message, which was 
the source code of the same image, from the picture. 
Figure 1: Image processed using the Ostrichinator web demo. The 
image was initially classified as class 0283: tiger cat, but after pro-
cessing, the image is classified as class 0010: ostrich. 
Relation to Own Artistic Practice 
The author has conducted explorations in adversarial image 
approaches within her own research-based artistic practice. 
One such exploration looked at abstraction as a weak spot 
in image classification algorithms. Due to the absence of im-
age classifiers accounting for abstraction, non-representa-
tive images are a great challenge for algorithms to classify. 
As a critique of the over-determination in machine learning 
research, the author compiled a data-set of abstract paintings 
from the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s online database and 
subjected the images to algorithmic analysis using the Wolf-
ram image identifier [11], a successful online image classi-
fication program. (see Figure 2) Surprisingly, the abstract 
images returned a similar success rate compared to ex-
pressly-designed adversarial images. 98% of the images 
were categorised incorrectly as being objects ranging from 
axes to eggbeaters, even a sea snake and an igneous rock. 
2% of the images were correctly categorised as paintings. 
The abstract paintings analysed in this experiment bore little 
or no visual resemblance to the classes assigned to them by 
the computer, but each misclassification added layers of po-
etic meaning to the respective image. The results of the ex-
periment point toward the conclusion that adversarial im-
ages owe their success not to being specially designed to 
trick algorithms, but rather to being abstractions for which 
there is no image class in a system which insists all images 
belong in a category. While abstraction for humans appears 
to be a continuum along which representations vary, image 
analysis algorithms lack such notions of conceptual connec-
tion across visually diverse images. 
Operative Images 
Harun Farocki's theory of the operative image is useful in 
understanding the processes at work in adversarial images. 
He describes a turn away from representation in favour of 
implementing visual procedures which may or may not be 
intelligible to human viewers. 
 "These are images that do not represent an object, but ra-
ther are part of an operation." [1]  
In an operative image, what is displayed on the screen is 
merely a by-product of the operation the image helped to 
perform. Thus, there is less need to make digital images in-
terpretable to "meat-eyes" [12] and we find ourselves im-
mersed in an image culture where humans are at times a sec-
ondary audience. A drone, for example, searches for a flight 
path using digital video, verifying landmarks as it flies, and 
adjusting its course accordingly.  In the footage Farocki used 
for his piece "Eye/Machine" and which he uses as an exam-
ple of an operative image, there's frankly not much for hu-
man viewers to see.  The video is primarily used as input to 
guide the flight of a drone. Here, the visual is subjugated to 
the procedure of navigation and the work fluctuates between 
visualisation and non-visual processes. While operative im-
ages are not necessarily intended to communicate with the 
human senses, they do so nonetheless. There is a digital res-
idue for us to look at, though we may not understand what 
it represents. Harun Farocki's work on operative images has 
been described as an exploration of how to see like a ma-
chine [12] and it offers a useful perspective on the human 
interpretation of images intended for computers. 
Decipherability & Obfuscation 
The parallel interpretation which occurs in adversarial im-
ages entails a two-sided invisibility. There are two levels on 
which the image functions upon: the human-decipherable 
image, which is obscured from the computer, and the com-
puter-decipherable image, which is obscured from the hu-
man viewer. To render an image indecipherable, in terms of 
adversarial images, is to ensure it can be read in more than 
one way. Thus, an image may be unreadable while its in-
tended meaning is hidden in plain sight. Often machine 
learning systems are opaque, even to their creators, so the 
errors which arise from adversarial images offer useful in-
sights into their functioning. Adversarial images can help to 
visualise incongruencies between biological vision and au-
tomated image processing by pointing out errors in interpre-
tation. Images which are categorised by algorithms as a dif-
ferent image class than their human-designated category al-
low us to examine what signifiers are involved in the process 
of miscategorisation. The kinds of methodologies used in 
adversarial image attacks are predicated on assumptions as 
to how human perception and machine learning image anal-
ysis relate to one another. For example, in order to create an 
image which will pass for a representation of a face for ei-
ther a computer or a human viewer, it is necessary to know 
what signifiers indicate faciality to the respective receiver 
and what defines the parameters of the given perceptual sys-
tem. Situations where image-class signifiers are not aligned 
with one-another demonstrate the gulf of difference between 
human visual processing and that of computers. 
 Adversarial approaches demand a certain level of objec-
tivity in the image interpretation process, for an image to be 
deciphered as an intended, “correct” interpretation, upon 
which a human audience can easily form a consensus. “No, 
that's not a rifle, it's clearly a turtle.” This requires that 
Figure 2: Abstract painting as classified by the Wolfram image 
identifier. 
 
images be human-decipherable while being deciphered by 
computers as a different, pre-selected "target class". In this 
kind of interaction with images, human and computer visual 
processing tasks occur on different planes, based on funda-
mentally different processes and criteria. The overlap be-
tween human and computer interpretation of symbolic clas-
ses is thereby explored using human-oriented signifiers and 
parallel, but different, computer-oriented symbolic classes. 
Conclusion 
Digital images are palimpsests of information, containing 
far more than what is intelligible to the human eye. The pho-
tographic paradigm prevails, yet there is more at work below 
the surface of the image, their basis in algorithms concealed 
by a veneer of realism. The turn toward indecipherability 
and obscurity seen in adversarial images marks a shift in the 
culture of the screen [13], moving away from traditional pic-
torial representation toward that of actionable images [14]. 
Similarly, the progression which can be seen through the ex-
amples mentioned in this paper show how the operation of 
solving a visual task, causing an error for instance, takes pri-
ority over an adversarial image's visual content. It is neces-
sary for the image to be transformed while remaining hu-
man-readable, but the human-readable representation is 
merely a cover for the message it sends to the computer or 
the reverse. In many cases, digital image processes are ob-
scured from the view and understanding of humans, yet the 
errors visible in adversarial approaches reveal the disjunc-
tion between parts of images intended for human eyes and 
those for computer processing. The black box nature of im-
age processing algorithms is rendered visible by identifying 
points where neural networks come out of alignment with 
human vision. The diverse adversarial practices examined 
here trace the boundaries between visibility, invisibility, hu-
man and computer, revealing hidden nuances of each. The 
image performs a function, which ends up deciphering hu-
man image interpretation at the same time as that of com-
puters.  
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